Don Camillo and Peppone Reloaded: Father Brown and Comrade Slavoj [text]

 

Update (August 2017) – one text I have overlooked is the very good philosophical reflection on Žižek’s use of Chesterton’s allegorical story by George Fried ‘Where’s the Point: Zizek and the Broken Sword’. I agree with most of what he has to say and would probably have produced a much shorter piece which would have focused more on Father Brown’s methodology.

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This post is not meant to be primarily a critique of Žižek, even though he occupies most of the space in it, but to use him as a contrast to bring out what is worth salvaging from Gilbert K. Chesterton’s form of thinking (though not much of its content). The work of deconstructing Žižek’s political rhetoric has already been done successfully by better writers. “Successfully”, that is, in terms of intellectual coherence and conclusiveness – less so in that Žižek still enjoys huge popularity among the academic Left. My favourite is Adam Kirsch’s 2008 ‘The Deadly Jester’ in The New Republic, despite some unjustified claims about the philosophical traditions Žižek draws on.
Further it should be noted that the parallel implied to the two heroes of Giovannino Guareschi’s Mondo Picolo finds its limit in the fact that both the Catholic priest and the Communist mayor are united in their unequivocal antifascism – which can be said of neither Chesterton (who was tempted by Mussolini) and nor Žižek (who congratulates Heidegger on joining the Nazi Party)

The BBC’s favourite “Marxist philosopher” Slavoj Žižek makes ample use of Father-Brown creator Gilbert K. Chesterton’s witticisms and stories in his grand project, the rehabilitation of the Western politico-metaphysical tradition from the Catholic Church to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[1] The title of his magnus opus in political theology In Defence of Lost Causes is taken from a chapter in Chesterton’s What’s Wrong With the World?  where Chesterton suggests that the ‘lost causes are exactly those which might have saved the world’Žižek draws heavily on Chesterton in his reading of Christianity, but the most important thing he gets out of Chesterton is the rhetorical tactic of contradicting obvious truths by way of paradoxical statement. But, while the paradoxes of Chesterton lend themselves to frivolously totalitarian abuse, I will argue that the contrast between the two could not be much greater.

(more…)

a quick note on Chesterton (Father Brown) and Zizek (Heidegger, Stalin) [#withoutwords]

scc3a8ne-uit-de-film-don-camillo-e-lon-peppone-1955

[text]

anthropologist lost in lebensraum

Tim Ingold’s (1993) notion of a ‘continuity of culture’ has (I think: rightfully) been hailed as a powerful challenge to ideas of insurmountable difference between “cultures” – a notion that reconciles diversity with universality. Which makes it ever so difficult to understand (and quite upsetting – hence apologies for the emotionally charged tone of the following) why he thinks it’s a good idea to dabble in Nazi terminology – even if pulled from a Nazi theorist who (for reasons to be analysed elsewhere) has been issued a free-of-charge indulgence by the collective of eco-conscious left academics: Martin Heidegger. Ingold musters up – of all the verbal smoke grenades Heidegger’s got in his arsenal – the concept of Lebensraum in order to make a case for his outdoorsy notion that ‘to show that to inhabit the world – rather than to occupy it – is to live life, as we say colloquially, “in the open”’ (Ingold 2008). Somehow the word “space” is still too indoorsy and urban, so something more earthy, something more chthonic, something more…  Germanic should do the trick. Raum, not space. What’s the difference? It is this:

‘To appreciate the difference, you have only to compare the English “living room” with German Lebensraum. For English speakers the “room” is simply an interior compartment of a house, while “living” comprises a suite of everyday activities that residents would undertake in it. In the notion of Lebensraum, by contrast, the meaning of life comes closer to what the philosopher Martin Heidegger  identified as the foundational sense of dwelling: not the occupation of a world already built but the very process of inhabiting the earth.’

I immediately asked myself: Does he not know what role the concept played in Nazi ideology – and particularly in the justification for the assault on Eastern Europe where the ethnic Germans were to be reintegrated into an all-encompassing Germany, the Slavs were to be enslaved and the Jews to be murdered (see Neumann 1967, pp.138ff.) to make space for “Aryan” colonist to “dwell” that part of the world? It instantly turns out that he does:

As a space, the clearing is open, but as a place in the world, it is enclosed. It was this duplicity, Olwig argues (2002, page 7), that allowed Nazi propagandists, in the run-up to the Second World War, to seize upon the notion of Lebensraum as justification at once for the unlimited expansion and for the bounded self-sufficiency of the German nation. Somewhat complicity in this enterprise himself, Heidegger was nothing if not equivocal on the matter. For having insisted that clearing, as “making room”, extends to a boundary, he promptly went on to characterise this boundary as a horizon, “not that at which something stops but … that from which something begins its presencing” (1971, page 154, emphasis in the original). Far from being hedged around by as yet uncleared land, the inhabitant now appears ensconced in a world that extends as far as the eye can see. (ibid)

Somewhat complicitly? From 1933 Heidegger was a card carrying Nazi – and forget about the myth (manufactured by Heidegger himself) that he had given up on the Partei very soon after his short spell has brown-shirted leader of German academia 1933f. In 1943, with German troops defending their furthest advances into the Russian steppe, also the year Lebensraum was extended into the depths of the Warsaw Ghetto, St Martin writes a justification of the bio-imperialist concept:

“Erhaltung und Steigerung kennzeichnen die in sich zusammengehörigen Grundzüge des Lebens. Zum Wesen des Lebens gehört das Wachsenwollen, die Steigerung. Jede Erhaltung des Lebens steht im Dienste der Lebenssteigerung. Jedes Leben, das nur auf Erhaltung beschränkt ist, ist schon Niedergang. Die Sicherung des Lebensraumes z.B. ist für das Lebendige niemals das Ziel, sondern nur ein Mittel zur Lebenssteigerung. Umgekehrt erhöht wiederum das gesteigerte Leben das frühere Bedürfnis nach Raumerweiterung.” (Heidegger 1977: 229) ‘Preservation and heightening are characteristics of the associated principles of life. The will to grow, heightening, is part of the essence of life. All preservation of life serves the heightening of life. All life that is limited to its preservation is already in decline. Securing Lebensraum [living space, i.e. habitat], for example, never is the aim of the living but only a means to the heightening of life. And heightened life, in turn, increases the initial need for the expansion of space.’ [my translation – “Steigerung” given as “heightening”, but also can imply “increase”, “expansion”, “enhancement” and “acceleration”]

This is nothing but a philosophical justification for the völkisch “war effort” in which one people’s Lebensraum was another’s graveyard. But let’s, for a moment, adopt the benevolent naivety of the critical intellectual and act as if Heidegger’s apparent Nazism wasn’t enough of a reason to be careful with anything coming out of that school of “thought”. It’s still plain wrong. I’ve always been slightly annoyed by that blanket assumption that anything that comes out of a German dictionary must be deeper and more meaningful than anything that the allegedly shallow, globalised and always already commercialised language that is English has to offer. In most cases it’s just the result of linguistic mistakes. It is, at least, in this case. Raum and room are merely cognates that hardly ever translate into each other – although translations never achieve full congruence, room is pretty synonymous with Zimmer while Raum is correctly translated by, yes, the despised space. Outer space, in German is “Weltraum”, and living room isWohnzimmer… the room where you live in. Simple as that. To juxtapose Lebensraumand living room in order to demonstrate the limitations of English to capture what it means to be a living being inhabiting the world is to suggest that while the English live in houses, the Germans live in the woods… Lebensraum is best translated into habitat – as that denotes what the German concept in most cases means. It is a biological concept denoting the geographical area where a given species is found – and that (not its alleged magical ability to simultaneously encapsule boundedness and expansion)  is why it’s been so easily integrated into Nazi ideology. If you think of humanity as a set of biologically distinct races locked into a planetary fight-to-the-death for survival, then it’s all about the defence and expansion of habitats. No pseudo-philosophical exegesis needed here. (and of course, as habitat, Lebensraum is something you do occupy and not just dwell in) The question remains: how could this happen? Is it just a slightly embarrassing, but otherwise not very significant, instance of misplaced deification of German as the language of deep thought and of the lamentable but inconsequential fact that the ‘writings of this reactionary thinker [Heidegger] now have the status of sacred texts, which are the subject of much exegesis by scores of admiring acolytes.’ (Morris 1997: 323)? Or is it symptomatic for an overemphasis on immersion and dismissive disdain for professional distance, going hand in hand with a hypostasis of the rural and the wild and contempt for the urban that counteracts the cosmopolitan recognition of the continuity of culture that (for me) is the main attraction of Ingold’s approach? I can’t help thinking that in his (2008b) Heideggerisand proposal of an anthropology that is constituted by a “thinking-with” as opposed to “thinking about” runs the danger of denying the professional distance of the researcher (which is more than the occasional sideways glance he  suggests as key to original insight) and risks deleting one crucial aspect of what enables the aimed-for sociological imagination (he makes reference to C Wright Mills…). The autonomous imagination (Stephen/Suryani 2000) appealed to in form of Ojibwa dreaming (Ingold 2008b: 84) as paradigm for the sideways glance is forgetful about the fact that, commonly, the autonomous imagination from Sufis to shamans to hermeneutic social scientists does involve practices of distancing (retreat, travel, isolation) as well as immersion.   In the end an anthropologist sitting in an armchair who is conscious of the continuity of culture may be in a preferable position compared to one indulging in a false intimacy of an “full immersion” and who forgets their own non-identity (as well as everybody else’s). Doing your “philosophy in the open” can make you forgetful about the fact that you also belong to the privileged group of cosmopolitan ‘frequent travellers’ (Calhoun 2002) which induces false identifications along the lines of that one philosopher-in-the-open who mistook himself for a Black Forest peasant. (Heidegger 1934)   Calhoun, Craig (2002): ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’, in: Steven Vertovec/Robin Cohen (eds): Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.86-109. Heidegger, Martin (1963) [1934]: ‘Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?’, in: Martin Heidegger: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976, pp.9-13 Heidegger, Martin (1977) [1943]: ‘Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”‘. In: Martin Heidegger: Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe 1.Abt, 5.Bd, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, pp.209-67 Ingold, Tim (2008): ‘Bindings against Boundaries: Entanglements of Life in an Open World’, in:Environment and Planning A, Vol.40, pp.1796-1810 Ingold, Tim (2008b): ‘Anthropology is notEthnography’, in: Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol.154, pp.69-92 Ingold, Tim (1993): ‘The Art of Translation in a Continuous World’, in: Pálsson, Gísli (ed.): Beyond Boundaries: Understanding, Translation and Anthropological Discourse, Oxford: Berg, pp. 210-30 Morris, Brian (1997): ‘In Defence of Realism and Truth: Critical Reflections on the Anthropological Followers of Heidegger’, in: Critique of Anthropology, Vol.17, No.3, pp.313-40 Neumann, Franz (1967): Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944, London: Frank Cars (orig. 1942/44 Oxford University Press New York) Stephen, Michele /Suryani, Luh Ketut (2000): ‘Shamanism, Psychosis and Autonomous Imagination’, in: Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, Vol.24, pp.5-40   PS Talking about Raum– it should be noted that Heidegger contrary to popular belief does not source his concepts from common, authentic, rooted language but, as Bourdieu points out, from the bureaucratic vocabulary of the public administrator. Bourdieu shows this for the notion of Sorge (“care”), but it can be equally shown for the notion of “dwelling” “wohnen”. A living room (as Ingold conjures up that notion as something very limited that should be abandoned for the open Raum of the tundra) is, as stated above, a Wohnzimmer and the correct translation of wohnen  is to live as used in “I live in London”, “I live in a terraced house” etc. The only occasion where the verb comes up in ordinary language is in exchanges like: “Where do you live?” “I live in…”. There is no activity wohnen – so the sentence “Ich gehe jetzt nachhause und wohne ein paar Stunden bevore ich ausgehe” (I’m going home now to live a couple of hours before going out”) does not make any sense. Bureaucratic German, in contrast, has quite a lot of use for the concept – and as the translation of Lebensraum as habitat suggests, they are mostly about inhabiting in the sense of (legitimately) occupying (an inhabitant/resident of a town is an Einwohner, the government office where you have to register every change of residence (Wohnsitzwechsel) is the Einwohnermeldeamt (“inhabitants registration office”). Bureaucrats are interested in the number of Bewohner (inhabitants again) of every residential building etc etc. So the earthy notion that we bewohnen the world (dwell in the world…) is already fraught with an imperialistic claim to ownership and a drive to administrate and govern… Heideggerian vocabulary, it seems, is a convenient vehicle to lay claim, simultaneously, on a caring, attentive, understanding academic innocence and on governmentally administered research funds, teaching positions … power.   Bourdieu, Pierre (1996): The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Cambridge: Polity.

Hybridity, Alterity and Beyond – A Simmelian Perspective on Ebruesque Identity

Kardeşin duymaz, eloğlu duyar

Hybridity and alterity are concepts that feature highly in cosmopolitan critiques of culturalist (including multi-culturalist) projections of homogeneity in a drive against classificatory thinking (e.g. Çağlar 1997). Cosmopolitanism can be characterised as a universalist-liberal project opposed to a more communitarian multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism tries to evade the danger of reifying racial, ethnic or religious and political identities, thus leading to alterity rather than difference and hybridity rather than reified identity. Multiculturalism is debated mainly around the collective cultural, religious and political representation of minority communities and ultimately as a question of citizenship (e.g. Modood 1995 – and even in the case of the ‘banal multicultures’ advocated by Amin 2002). Proponents of multiculturalism have therefore resorted to a (partial) defence of “essentialism” (Modood 2000, Werbner1997). While multiculturalism emphasises diversity and difference of identifiable (ethno-religious) cultures (e.g. Modood 2000), cosmopolitanism favours alterity. This concept is understood to denote otherness that cannot be captured as difference of clearly defined identity categories – rather by a noted and confusing absence of such categories (Sennett 2002, also cf. Iveson 2006). Sennett goes back to Simmel’s famous essay on the stranger – and I will propose that Simmel has more to contribute to this idea than just the etymology of this notion.

To illustrate, in his photo essay book Ebru Atilla Durak (2006) presents a series of ludicrously beautiful photographs of people from or in Turkey of different ethnicities (Turkish, Turkmen, Azeri, Kurdish, Laz, Zaza, Armenian, Jewish, German, Pomak etc.), faiths (Sunni, Alevi, Assyrian Christian, Jewish, Nusayri, etc.), location (İstanbul, Kars, Mardin, Van etc.), different age and gender, modern, urban, traditional etc. As he classifies the pictures by ethnicity, religion and location, the book has the feel of an old anthropological catalogue, using a quasi-Linnaean botanising categorisation. At first sight Durak, therefore, could be accused of a painting a picture of ethno-religious cultural diversity for the discerning and knowledgeable cosmopolitan consumer (Hannerz 1996: 103) whose cultural capital feeds on benevolent but nonetheless Orientalist stereotype (e.g. Tekgül 2012 for the consumption of literature), referencing ethnic identities as simultaneously authentic and immutable. For the (still multiculturalist) “cosmopolitan”, Hannerz (1996: 111) says, ‘there is value in diversity as such, but they are not likely to get it, in anything like the present form, unless other people are allowed to carve out special niches for their cultures and keep them.’ For the consumer of diversity the blurring of ethnic identities risks ‘depleting the imaginary resources of the exotic’ (Kaplan, 1995: 59, also cf. Varul 2008).

But the careful selection of texts that accompany these photos and the photography itself(see here for some of them) thematise this as problematic and act as constant reminders that each individual is defined not just by an intersection of collective classifications but by their own personal history and individual experiences within and without the groups they belong to, and their own decisions regarding how they relate to the collective identities they are born into. Çetin (2006), when talking about her discovery of her Armenian heritage and the notion of being a melez/hybrid, protests against a notion “belonging” that she sees as a straightjacket, while vehemently rejecting violations of any components of that hybrid identity. And in the introduction Altınay (2006: 24), drawing on various theorists and using the metaphor of the ebru – the art of water drawing or “marbling”, emphasises the continuity and pervasiveness of hybridisation in which stability of identity is ephemeral, a temporary fixation of something that otherwise is always in flux. He therefore suggests replacing the bounded ‘mosaic multi-culturalism’ with a fluentebruesque one.  – advocating a cosmopolitanism in which – as the Devon based artist Pery Burge introduces her paintings in thermofluids – “the  pattern is new in every moment” .

The idea of hybridity has been surpassed by the concept of alterity, partly because the concept of hybridity can be (mis)taken to imply the recombination and mixture of pureforms, i.e. as implying the very thing it is meant to undermine (as in the consuming “cosmopolitanism” criticised above). But my point here is that not even that fully captures the implications of hybridity as foundation of alterity. It does not capture what some of the texts (e.g. Elif Şafak’s story ‘E’ about a little girls reflections on the Atatürk portrait in her class room) and in fact that photographs themselves imply – and what Simmel declares to be a condition of the possibility of society as such: The fact that there is always some part of the personality that is not fully socialised. And crucially, this is not just a trivial observation about the incompleteness of the socialisation process, it is something that in itself contributes to sociality:

‘Each element of a group is not a societary part, but beyond that something else.That fact operates as social apriori in so far as the part of the individual which is not turned toward the group, or is not dissolved in it, does not lie simply without meaning by the side of his socially significant phase, is not a something external to the group, for which it nolens volens affords space; but the fact that the individual, with respect to certain sides of his personality, is not an element of the group, constitutes the positive condition for the fact that he is such a member in other aspects of his being. In other words, the sort of his socialized-being’ (Simmel 1910: 381)

In other words: in order to be a viable member of a society, one must be less, which ismore, than just a member of society – society is only possible if the individuals have something they can, as it were, “hold back” and in fact, do hold back. This despite the fact that as social beings, according to Simmel, we are constituted and determined by our place in history and our position in the social reciprocities that history has placed us in, we are ‘thrown’ into this ‘being with’ in a way, that makes it inevitable that we are a reflection of those social forces that reflects back on them. In contrast to Heidegger’s (and his postmodern followers’) anti-social aristocratic defiance against the “They”, das Man, the masses that stifle authentic selfhood (cf. Weiner 1992), Simmel shares Marx’s (1953: 6) socialist individualism that holds that as ζοων πολιτικον the human is not just ‘a sociable animal but one that can only indivdiualise within society’.  Simmel goes further than this and sees at least a minimal degree of individualisation as nigh inevitable and sociality and individuality as concomitant:

‘…between individual and society the Within and Without are not two determinations which exist alongside of each other – although they may occasionally develop in that way, and even to the degree of reciprocal enmity – but that they signify the whole unitary position of the socially living human being. His existence is not merely, in subdivision of the contents, partially social and partially individual, but it stands under the fundamental, formative, irreducible category of a unity, which we cannot otherwise express than through the synthesis or the contemporariness of the two logically antithetical determinations – articulation and self-sufficiency, the condition of being produced by, and contained in, society, and on the other hand, of being derived of and moving around its own center.’ (Simmel 1910: 387)

A minimum of individualisation is owed to (as much as it is the cause of) a minimum degree of alienation. As the biological anthropologist and sociologist Helmuth Plessner notes against the longing of the existence-philosophical longing for unreserved encounters of authentic selves:

‘No matter how many times – in accordance with the idea – that ineffable individual uniqueness is comprehended by the ground of being of community and, by all of its members, persons never penetrate through to the ground, as the latter is not definitely determined because it is eternal potentiality. As a being of spirit and soul, humans have the enormous consciousness of the ability to deviate from the path of their own individual law, or, at least, the right to rebel against their own definitions.’ (Plessner 1999: 105)[1]

I will argue that generalised hybridity and alterity are but accentuations of a human condition – hence my reference to the biological and philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner which provides the bridge from Simmel’s concept of necessarily incomplete socialisation to his notion of the stranger (to whose strangeness, Fremdheit, the concept of alterity is much akin – see Sennett 2002). I am also turning to Plessner as the submersion of his work in the 1920s and 1930s illustrates the counter-intuitive character of the acceptance of alienation as condition of freedom at a time of search for authentic selfhood and total (or rather totalitarian) effervescence in real community. A time when the drive for nationalist homogenisation in the Turkish Republic was at its most enthusiastic – and in a place (Germany) where it would become far, far more extreme. The highest philosophical expression of the common intuition that happiness is to be found in rooted and bounded community and that the alienation associated with urbanity, civilisation and commercial culture is a curse, is to be found in Martin Heidegger’s concepts of Being-with (Mitsein) and the They (das Man) already mentioned above. And here we also find the contradictory nature of this intuition, namely that on the one hand authentic selfhood is prevented by the process of socialisation and pressures to conform that come with it – but that on the other hand these pressures are particularly strong where sociality entails distance and indifference.

‘But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection [Botmäßigkeit] to Others. Dasein’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. “The Others” whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to them essentially oneself, are thos who proximally and for the most part “are there” in everyday Being-with-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of all of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the “they” [das Man].‘ (Heidegger 1962: 163f.)[2]

This, of course, is a typically Heideggerian sleight of hand in which he situates himself ‘always beyond the beyond, unite and reconcile opposites verbally, in paradoxical, and magical, propositions’ (Bourdieu 1996: 61f.). As mentioned in my previous post: The situation in which the distanced being-with-others implies a danger of falling under the domination of others (and most feared by the proto-antisemitic conservative revolutionaries from Tönnies to Jünger: of public opinion) only because it uniquely affords freedom. It is the non-distant being-with-others, “authentic” community that stifles the anthropological potential of developing an unaffected self behind the roles and its opposite, the existence as a stranger in the Simmelian sense that makes authentic selfhood most likely to occur. Both Plessner and Simmel acknowledge that one can fail to realise the potential of an existence beyond what Heidegger calls the “They”, but crucially, this potential only arises in society – and the abhorred distantiality is functional in this realisation. Again, both acknowledge that there is a price to be paid, the loss of warmth and certainty through alienation. But the prize to be won is individual freedom and opportunities for human development – which is why Plessner calls for an outright heroism in defence of alienated sociability which affirms ‘the entire essential complex of society for the sake of the dignity of the individual and the social whole’ (Plessner 1999: 69f.). He vigorously defends the much reviled alienation and reification (which are unavoidable constituent components of the condition of alterity) as basis of our social nature:

‘Imitation and reification, on which rests the acquisition and use of language, share the same root, namely the human ability to disregard oneself and put oneself into the position of others.’ ‘Humans are able to differentiate their position as “here” from a “there”, which in inverse direction turns from a “there” into a “here”. The ability to separate out one’s own hand or an uttered sound is the basic condition for their instrumental treatment and imitation in fixed artefacts. Reification hence is a legitimate aspect of the human being and not at all a degenerated mode of existence…’ (Plessner 1976: 43)[3]

For Plessner as for Simmel this is a potential that can be realised to different degree – as Simmel puts it, ‘individuals, like callings and social institutions, are distinguished by the degree of that In-addition, which they possess or admit along with their social content’ (Simmel 1910: 382). And different forms of societisation afford the realisation of such different degrees of in-addition. For Simmel, metropolitan life, and in particular the commercialisation of life, the monetary mediation of social relations, is most conducive to this individuality-enhancing alterity (Simmel 1950, Simmel 1990). Plessner links it to the very metaphor of inauthentic social life – to acting in  roles:

‘The role as set of social functions and expectations of a performance is faced by the individual as an objective fact. For this reason, one allows, under the role concept, for a distance between the person and their social existence, which can be consoling: The human being, the individual, never is completely what he or she “is”. As employee or doctor, politician or tradesman, husband or bachelor, member of  a generation or of a nation, he is always “more” than that, a possibility  which does not exhaust itself in such modes of existence or merges with them. The wide range of the role concept, which comprises both the ascribed and achieved status, i.e. that which one is by birth and by circumstance in the social field, and that which one makes of oneself, makes possible the reserve of anindividuum ineffabile, a social sanctum, a sphere of privacy, intimacy and personal freedom. In so far the role concept safeguards respect for the indivdual as individual and shields them from their public existence.‘  (Plessner 1976: 66)[4]

Once role existence is generalised, as it is in the “They” of the modern world, alienation – estrangement – becomes the prevalent condition of social existence. In the city all are strangers in the sense Simmel uses the term – as someone who is simultaneously within and without society:

‘If wandering is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus the conceptional opposite to fixation at such a point, the sociological form of the “stranger” presents the unity, as it were of these two characteristics. This phenomenon too, however, reveals that spatial relations are only the condition, on the one hand, and the symbol, on the other, of human relations. The stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.’ (Simmel 1950: 402)

This mode of being can be understood, against the background of the partial non-socialisation as condition of sociality postulated by Simmel and the anthropological constitution of humans as eccentric diagnosed by Plessner, as a mere radicalisation of a universal human potential. Individuals, as Simmel (1910: 382) says, – ‘are distinguished by the degree of that In-addition which they possess or admit along with their social content’, and his stranger is the individual who has managed to maximise their In-addition as far as possible without relinquishing completely their membership in (metropolitan or cosmopolitan) society. The reification Plessner talks about is radicalised into a general attitude of objectivity as detached mode of engagement.

‘Objectivity is by no means non-participation (which is altogether outside both subjective and objective interaction), but a positive and specific kind of participation […] Objectivity may also be defined as freedom: the objective individual is bound by no commitments which could prejudice his perception, understanding, and evaluation of the given.’ (Simmel 1950: 404f.)

So there is a price to be paid for the individual freedom of ebruesque existence in the community of strangers – the loss of certainty and the anxiety that comes with it.  But against this stands the freedom to find each other in new commitments, in self-chosen communities. The kindness of strangers may be less intense and less reliable, but it for many it compares well with the cruelty of one’s own kind. And then there’s the love of strangers. The above mentioned novelist Elif Şafak

‘recounts with some pride being approached at a book signing by an undergraduate girl wearing a headscarf and her very unreligious, urban chic boyfriend. “We met in the pages of your book,” they told her.’ (Finkel w/o. year)

 

 

Altınay, Ayşe Gül (2006): ‘Ebru: Reflections on Water’, in Durak 2006, pp.19-25

Amin, Ash (2002): ‘Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity’, Report for the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, and the ESRC Cities Initiative.

Ariès, Phillipe (1962): Centuries of Childhood, London: Jonathan Cape.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1996): The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Cambridge: Polity.

Çağlar, Ayşe (1997): ‘Hyphenated Identities and the Limits of “Culture”’, in: Tariq Modood/Pnina Werbner (eds): The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe, London: Zed Books, pp.169-85.

Çetin, Fethiye (2006): ‘Hybrid Lives, Assumed Identities’, in Durak 2006, pp.58-9.

Durak, Attila (2006): Ebru: Reflections of Cultural Diversity in Turkey, Istanbul: Metis.

Finkel, Andrew (w/o. year): ‘Portrait of Elif Şafak’, Turkish Culture Portal, Turkish Cultural Foundation http://www.turkishculture.org/literature/literature/turkish-authors/elif-safak-258.htm?type=1

Hannerz, Ulf (1996): Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places, London: Routledge

Heidegger, Martin (1963) [1927]: Sein und Zeit, Tübingen : Niemeyer

Hoggart, Richard (1958) [1957]: The Uses of Literacy, Harmondsworth: Penguin

Iveson, Kurt (2006): ‘Strangers in the Cosmopolis’, in: J. Binnie/J. Holloway/S. Millington/C. Young (eds): Cosmopolitan Urbanism,London: Routledge.

Kaplan, Caren (1995) ‘“A World without Boundaries”: The Body Shop’s Trans/National Geographics’, in: Social Text, Vol.43, pp.45-66

Marx, Karl (1953): Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf), Berlin: Dietz

Navaro-Yashin, Yael (2002): Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press

Modood, Tariq (2000): ‘Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism, and the “Recognition” of Religious Groups’, in: Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds): Citizenship in Diverse Societies,Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.175-95.

Plessner, Helmuth (1981): „Grenzen der Gemeinschaft: Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus“ (1924), in: Gesammelte Schriften V, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Plessner, Helmuth (1999): The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism, New York: Humanity Books.

Sandıkçı, Özlem/Ger, Güliz (2007): ‘Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer in Turkey’, in: Fashion Theory, Vol.11, No.2/3, pp.189-210

Şafak, Elif (2006): ‘E’, in Durak 2006

Sennett, Richard (2002): ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Social Experience of Cities’, in: S. Vertovec/R. Cohen (eds): Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice,Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Simmel, Georg (1910): ‘How is Society Possible?’, in: American Journal of Sociology, Vol.16, No.3, pp.372-391

Simmel, Georg (1950): The Sociology of Georg Simmel, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press

Simmel, Georg (1990): The Philosophy of Money, London: Routledge

Tekgül, Perihan Duygu (2012): Around the World in English: The Production and Consumption of Translated Fiction in the UK between Cosmopolitanism and Orientalism, PhD Thesis, Sociology, University of Exeter.

Varul, Matthias Zick (2008a): ‘Consuming the Campesino – Fair Trade Marketing between Recognition and Romantic Commodification’, in: Cultural Studies, Vol.22, No.5, pp.654-679.

Weiner, James F. (1992): ‘Anthropology contra Heidegger – Part I: Anthropology’s Nihilism’, in: Critique of Anthropology, Vol.12, No.1, pp.75-90.

Werbner, Pnina (1997): ‘Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in the Constructions of Racism and Ethnicity’, in: Pnina Werbner/Tariq Modood (eds): Debating Cultural Hybridity,London: Zed Books


[1] „Mag hundertmal nach der Idee das Ineffabile individueller Eigenart vom Seinstgrund der Gemeinschaft und damit von allen ihr Angehörenden mit erfaßt sein, tatsächlich durchdringen die Menschen sich doch nie bis auf den Grund, der gar nicht festliegt, weil er ewige Potentialität ist. Als geistig-seelische Wesen haben sie das ungeheuere Bewußtsein, selbst von den Bahnen ihres individuellen Gesetzes abweichen zu können oder wenigstens des Rechtes, sich gegen seine Definition aufzulehnen.“ (Plessner 1983: 59)

[2] ‚In dieser zum Mitsein gehörigen Abständigkeit liegt  aber: das Dasein steht als alltägliches Miteinandersein in der Botmäßigkeit der Anderen. Nicht es selbst ist, die Anderen verfügt über die alltäglichen Seinsmöglichkeiten des Daseins. Diese Anderen sind dabei nicht bestimmte Andere. Im Gegenteil, jeder Andere kann sie vertreten. Entscheidend ist nur die unauffällige, vom Dasein als Mitsein unversehens schon übernommene Herrschaft der Anderen. Man selbst gehört zu den Anderen und verfestigt ihre Macht. „Die Anderen“, die man so nennt, um die eigene wesenhafte Zugehörigkeit zu ihnen zu verdecken, sind die, die im alltäglichen Miteinandersein zunächst und zumeist „da sind“. Das Wer ist nicht dieser und nicht jener, nicht man selbst und nicht einige und nicht die Summe Aller. Das „Wer“ ist das Neutrum, das Man.‘ (Heidegger 1963: 126)

[3] My translation of „Imitation und Vergegenständlichung, auf denen Erwerb und gebrauch einer Sprache beruhen, haben die gleiche Wurzel, nämlich das dem Menschen gegebene Vermögen, von sich absehen und sich in anderes versetzen zu können.“ „Der Mensch vermag darum seinen Standort als ein Hier von einem Dort zu trennen, welches in umgekehrter Richtung seinen Sinn vertauscht und aus einem Dort zu eiem Hier wird. Die eigene Hand oder den ausgestoßenen Laut als Sache wie in einem Dort vom Hier trennen zu können, ist die Grundvoraussetzung für ihre instrumentale Behandlung und Imitation in fixierten Gebilden, auf die sie zurückgreift und über die sie wie über Dinge verfügt. Verdinglichung ist mithin ein genuiner und legitimer Aspect des Menschen und keineswegs ein entarteter Modus seiner Existenz…“ (Plessner 1976: 43)

[4] My translation of „Rolle als gesellschaftiches Funktionselement[…] steht mitsamt den von ihr ausgehenden und ans sie geknüpften Erwartungen einer Leistung dem Individuum objektiv gegenüber. Daher billigt man unter dem Begriff der Rolle dem Menschen einen Abstand von seiner gesellschaftlichen Existenz zu, der etwas Tröstliches haben kann: der Mensch, der einzelne ist nie ganz das, was er ‚ist’. Als Angestellter oder Arzt, Politiker oder Kaufmann, als Ehemann oder Junggeselle, als Angehöriger seiner Generation und seines Volkes ist er doch immer ‚mehr’ als das, eine Möglichkeit, die sich in solchen Daseinsweisen nicht erschöpft und darin nicht aufgeht.

Gerade die weite Spannung des Rollenbegriffs, die den ascribed status und den achieved status zusammen umfaßt, also das, was einer durch Geburt und Umstände im sozialen Felde ist, und das, was er aus sich macht, ermöglicht das Reservat eines individuum ineffabile, einer sozialen Unberührtheit, einer Zone der Privatheit, der Intimität, der persönlichen Freiheit. Insoweit gewährt der Rollenbegriff Achtung vor dem einzelnen als dem einzelnen und schirmt ihn gegen sein öffentliches Wesen ab. Als ein unbestreitbar anpassungsfähiges Mittel zur theoretischen Bewältigung sozialer Getriebe wird der Begriff damit zugleich zu einer moralischen Erinnerung an das persönliche Reservat des einzelnen, an seine Privatexistenz.“(Plessner 1976: 66)

 

Becoming vs Being – Towards an anti-Heideggerian and post-Platonic Ontology of Fashion – A Preliminary Note

11.12.2012

[footnotes at the end of this post – links don’t work…]

As Simmelian/Bermanian Marxist, Plessner fan and antifascist, I have a deep aversion against the protagonists of the proto-fascist “conservative revolution” (konservative Revolution) in the Weimar Republic – people like “jurist” Carl Schmitt, the essayist and “novelist” Ernst Jünger, the “historian” Oswald Spengler … and best known and annoyingly popular among social scientists today, the philosopher Martin Heidegger. In my personal notes I tend to refer to him as “Heidi” for sake of shortness and ridicule – which until recently I thought of a merely phonetically based slur gesturing to the sense that he was a bit of country pumpkin (I’ve grown up with the Japanese TV anime version of Johanna Spyri’s Heidi). But on reflection, there is more to that mere slur (which I think is adequate nonetheless, given that much of Heidegger’s philosophical texts consist in plays on phonetic suggestiveness). I am referring here to the cliché story promoted by Heidegger himself about how he consulted, in the early years of Nazi reign, an old Black Forest peasant on whether he should take up a professorship in Berlin and give up his residence in the mountains – and the taciturn old man signals his disapproval of his friend’s idea of leaving the mountains for the city with nothing more than a nod.[1] It’s a cliché because, a good half century before, the scene was played out between Spyri’s Heidi and her grandfather, the Alm-Öhi – a mountain recluse in the Swiss Alps – when she was to be taken to Frankfurt by her aunt Dete who found a position as a maid in respectable bourgeois household (Heidi goes to the city in the end, but not voluntarily)[2]

Rudolf Munger, Illustration to Heidi (from wikipedia under creative commons)

 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5e/Heidi_Bild.jpg/883px-Heidi_Bild.jpg 

The parallels will have reverberated immediately with a German language audience who have grown up with the Heidi books: the authenticity of the mountainous forest life among simple folk firmly rooted in their Heimat versus the alienated city folk – merchants and intellectuals. To give credit to Johanna Spyri: her portrayal of the bourgeois of Frankfurt (especially Herr Sesemann, a businessman, and the family doctor only referred to as “Herr Doktor”) is much more benevolent than Heidegger’s generalised contempt for the alleged superficiality of urban professionals (characterised by ephemeral curiosity Neugier, idle talk Gerede[3] and noncommittal ambiguity Zweideutigkeit) – to put it blandly: with Heidegger it is the Germanic Blut und Boden open air country life versus the decadent city life. What he rejects is not the move to the capital of Nazi Germany – it is the move to the Jewish city (Frankfurt and Berlin being interchangeable in the antisemitic outlook).

As a Simmelian I intuitively take sides with the city here. Let me pick out the most superficial phenomenon associated with metropolitan life – the one that is used as an adjective to signify that something is ephemeral, unessential, and vacuous: fashion – to propose an anti-Heideggerian ontology of social life. Heidegger is often credited with making temporality central to our understanding of human existence, Becoming as the core of Being. I think this is a misconception. As Heidegger ontologises time and Becoming, de-historicises history, he still places Being before Becoming. As this is about fashion, curiosity as Neugier (which is a composite of neu “new” and Gier “greed” – Heidegger’s account plays to these meanings) is central. In the verdict on curiosity Heidegger affirms that true Being can only be had in arresting Becoming. He counters Neugier with Altgier(not his term – I couldn’t resist the temptation to come up with a Germanic neologism of my own): greed for the old. The acknowledgement of temporality and historicity is given the lie by the explicit contempt for all notions of moving away from one’s place (hence the hypostasis of rooted simplicity and immobility – Bodenständigkeit). Temporality and becoming are a threat to Being, the curious person as changing person always runs the risk of getting distracted (and seeks distraction in the exciting world of the metropolis). The term Heidegger uses is Zerstreuung which alludes not just to distraction, but also dispersal. One’s identity is at stake when one is distracted.[4] While many social scientists today celebrate Heidegger for his philosophical assertion of the importance of immanent being-in-the-world which they mistake for recognition of the ordinary everyday life, what follows from his ontology is the imperative to close oneself off from the world (or rather, from all of it which isn’t dull routine, as his Black-Forest paper suggests).

Decades before, Simmel’s theory of fashion does the opposite: in an implicitly post-Platonic inversion he suggests that in fashion change, constant becoming constitutes an ideal Being (both individual and social) that has reality as a vanishing point towards individuals and societies aspire and develop, but that neither precedes that aspiration and development, nor exists independently of it. The Platonic forms/ideas secularised – the Weberian ideal type realised. To overstate my case-to-be-made – even the ontological outlook promoted by Heidi Klum is more profound than that promoted by the Heidi of the Mountains. Needless to say that it is also much less prone to lead into totalitarian dreams of authenticity as promoted by the likes of Heidegger on the Far Right and Lukács on the Far Left and more conducive to the commitment to civilised/civilian social progress stubbornly defended on the Centre Right by the likes of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper and on the Liberal to Actually-Quite-Far Left by the likes of John Dewey, Marshall Berman and Leo Kofler.

To quickly summarise Plato’s take on Being and Becoming – Plato was confronted with the problem of how the identity of the person, the state and in fact the cosmos as a whole was to be thought when there evidently was constant change. According to Parmenides only the unchanging has the status of being, what isn’t always what it is has no existence at all. According to Heraclites, all things do not just change, they are change – including seemingly unchanging objects such as stones. If you accept both these claims (as did Plato), you either have to accept that nothing exists at all or (as did Plato) find a way of anchoring the ever changing in something that never changes. The never changing, the eternal for Plato was the world of forms or ideas which is only accessible in philosophical contemplation, and of which the world we live in, ourselves included, is but an imperfect image. Plato illustrates the relation between the world we live in and the world of ideas with a creation myth in his Timaios.

A creator figure (imagined as craftsman) looks at the eternal being and takes this as a model to form out of the pristine matter that is in such chaos that even the concept of time is applicable to it into an image of being. As eternal being cannot be created (else it would have a beginning, i.e. there would have been a time it is not and according to Parmenides’ argument would not be at all), all that the divine craftsman can achieve is to recreate an imperfect image, depicting eternal being in temporal becoming.[5] I think a good way of envisioning this is if you try to create a complete two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional object: you will dissolve the image into a sequence, ideally a film, i.e. you translate a being into a becoming in which an unmovable object is laid out in a moving image. The world (and in it all identity – that of human beings, and that of communities and societies) is constituted in every single moment, so even apparent immobility and continuity – from a very steady character to a stone – is reconstituted every single moment. So all worldly “being” as in fact “becoming” – and even what appears as continuous unchanging being is, as Plato imagines it, changing into the same thing, i.e. recreated as the same or rather: something very, very similar all the time. Identity as developing is the constant construction of similar, but not identical versions over time. For Plato this sense of continuous existence in and through time is only possible by matter being oriented, looking at, aspiring to the eternal being. He uses the image of Eros as son of poverty and plenty, constantly aspiring of plenty and perfection but constantly drawn down into chaos.

A secularised version of this would be to think the ideal forms as Weberian ideal types or as a Freudian ego ideal – i.e. to turn around the sequence: not the orientation of temporal becoming towards an idea constitutes identity through time, but the self-organisation of the world into temporal order postulates, suggests ideas as vanishing points towards their becoming is oriented. A conclusion from change (as opposed to chaotic movement) to the something that changes and thus remains identical.[6] The anticipatory nature of human action encourages an intuitive interpretation of the sum of all actions, expressions, intentions as more or less successful aspiration to ideals/forms.[7]

The most radical secularisation of the old question of Being and Becoming is suggested by Georg Simmel with respect to fashion – the very essence of superficiality and (in the world of Heidegger and his fellow conservative revolutionaries) inauthentic flight from being. And Simmel does point out the absence of inherent meaning and content in fashionable clothing, contributing to the notion that it is all about distinction and emulation. He develops a dynamics of aesthetic innovation as escape from emulation that is similar to what Veblen lays out at about the same time (1899) in his Theory of the Leisure Class. While Simmel is therefore often cited alongside Veblen, what is often forgotten[8] is his idea about fashion is a specifically modern way to allow the reconciliation of conformity and individual self-expression. With fashion, as with more traditional modes of clothing, we simultaneously show belonging (there are others wearing what we wear – and we tend to share some sense of collective identity with them) and difference (distinction from those who belong to other classes, status groups, lifestyle communities, tribes etc.).[9]The innovation that comes with modern fashion is that we also make differences within groups – to the extent that fashion never can become uniform. The very sense of belonging to a group is mediated through individual self-expression. To comply with a particular style it is not enough to just copy what others are wearing – one has to copy the generative grammar of that style, i.e. appropriate the taste (a process Bourdieu had much to say about much later in his Distinction), and that can only be done if the chosen outfit differs from everybody else’s while still being within the collective canon of taste, i.e. is a truly individual expression of that style. This, alongside the flight from emulation (which is the weaker of the two arguments), entails constant aesthetic change and leads to the paradox that in fashion (as opposed to traditional dress and to uniforms) individual and collective identities are expressed in and through change. Identity cannot rest on the reproduction of the always-same – or at least not if it is not to turn out one-dimensional, a cartoon character. Simmel points out another achievement of fashion: the threat of disintegration of identity through change is turned into an opportunity in which identity is deepened through change.

The result is a literally more superficial identity in the very trivial sense that there are more surfaces and a stronger interest in surfaces. But by means of temporal sequentialisation and transcendent reference to past and future this increase in surface also allows for greater depth – the depth Andy Warhol alluded to when he said about himself that he is ‘a deeply superficial person’.[10] The task of maintaining personal identity becomes a more demanding one, now that the Heraclitean truth becomes ever more obvious that we cannot step in the same river twice not just because the water won’t be identical, but because we ourselves never are identical. So personal identity needs much more work than it used to, and it is a much more complex thing. This insight has led to a common belief among theorists in the 1980s that we will end up with “multiple personality disorder” becoming the common form of identity. This postmodernistic anticipation, too, has some roots in the konservative Revolution as it builds on the notion of a out-of-bounds, disorderly world of media and advertising where sensual overload (Arnold Gehlen’s Reizüberflutung)[11]leads to distraction as Zerstreuung – dispersal, disintegration.  This didn’t happen, despite MTV and internet. To the contrary, the increased visibility after the microelectronic revolution increased the burden for bothvariety of expression and consistency in style. So neither the one-dimensional always-the-same-suit-and-tie character of Mr Bean, nor the constant personality switch of David Bowie are viable options. For Simmel the fact that fashion (and of course a forteriori and individual style)[12] connects past and projected futures in a present point, joins up nostalgic and aspirational moments, it constitutes a strong presence of an integrated self.[13] Especially for individual styles, this is borne out by anthropological research (e.g. Woodward 2005). Thus, change itself no longer is a threat to identity – full acknowledgment of the Heraclitean insight that all is Fire leads to the recognition that embracing change is our only chance to achieve some durability[14] without collapsing into one-dimensionality. Fashion (like other modern modes of self-expression) provides us with masks[15] which not only fall short of offering authentic selfhood, but through this shortfall, as Simmel implies and Plessner explains,[16] creates the opportunity of being more than one’s social role, to go beyond social existence and find authentic selfhood through and beyond the masks. Against the Heidegger’s radicalisation of Rousseau’s yearning for pristine authenticity before socialisation they posit a radicalisation and delimitation of Hegel’s assertion that authentic selfhood is an endpoint, not a beginning. Both assert that what Heidegger will lay out as the threat of mass society, of the They (das Man) is indeed a potential outcome: that one loses oneself in social role performance, gives over all responsibility to convention.[17] However, there is a twist.

In response to the mortal threat of mass society and its fashions Heidegger alongside other post-Rousseauvians seeks refuge in the simplicity of country life and – but what Heidegger and other seekers of rustic authenticity mistake for an escape from the flimsy changeability of the metropolis is no closer to Being than the fashion cycle – they repeat a misunderstanding that we already find in Plato: that the self-reproducing object that moves in one place – above all the fixed stars – is closer to the Forms than the circling, spiralling, perambulating parts of the cosmos.[18] Here philosophy is guided not by reasoning but by conservative mood and aesthetic preference for stability and calm. To go back to our metaphor of the 2D imaging of three dimensional objects: The long still shot may aesthetically communicate a more profound sense of full being – the moving shot will always capture more of the three-dimensional reality by adding the dimension of time to the two spatial dimensions it our visual perception is confined to. What Plato in does his favouring of the seemingly unmoving (but in his own account self-imitating same-moving)  is akin to what Heidegger does in his portrayal of the old farmer who, solely on account of having been in the same place all his life, aging but otherwise unchanging, is attributed with greater depth.

And of course, Heidegger’s own sartorial claim to depth and constancy (the famous existential suit) is no less an act, a self-stylisation, than is the dandyism of an urbane artist.[19] But it is a more dishonest one – the assertion that he does not give anything on the recognition by academic philosophers and other intellectuals and everything on the judgement of the people of Todtnauberg is given the lie by the mere fact that he publicises his life in the woods.

So while the famous existential suit, the insistence on expressionless basic clothing was intended to signal spiritual, ontic depth that can do without surface. Whatever the depths of his philosophy – as a human being sitting in his hut on Todtnauberg he has no claim to superior depth over the city dweller, no claim to a more valid life. Whatever the contribution to metaphysics or to its deconstruction, his philosophy quite obviously was not a guide to moral responsibility or even to consistent personhood. In an apparent anticipation of mass abdication from personal responsibility in under the Nazis in Being and Time he sees mass society, the They (das Man), as temptation for a flight from accountability (the justification for one’s own doing being that others do the same) – and Simmel acknowledges that one function of the sharing of stylistic principles in fashion is alleviating the burden of responsibility.[20] But that is only necessary because fashion reflects a social situation in which individual responsibility, the ascription of identity to individuals’ decisions and actions, has become the default assumption. What Simmel, in his writings about money, about the city, about sociability, has shown is that such responsibility increases in mass society – while the longing of Heidegger and associates for a more authentic selfhood amounts to the opposite. While in his critique of Heidegger’s political ontology Habermas is quite forgiving about Heidegger’s involvement with the Third Reich, it is his inability after 1945 to take responsibility  for his own actions in the run-up to and during Nazi rule that he highlights as unforgivable sin for a philosopher of authenticity and responsibility.[21]

At least the fashionable person achieves consistency and continuity in and through change that is more likely to safeguard enough personal integrity that cannot be easily broken by complete reinvention such as that of Heidegger after his ‘turn’ (Kehre – NB the allusion to the act of cleaning with a broom kehren, indicating a the cathartic and hugely dishonest cleansing of all past identity; or at least a rather dishonest re-invention). It is symptomatic that the champion of true authenticity neither abhorred uniforms nor was able to maintain a coherent moral biography, while the multiplicity of inauthentic masks offers the opportunity of an identity in and through change – or rather: as complex societies require both specialisation in functional context and continuous personhood, the multiplicity of roles as well as the sequence of sartorial change stipulate authentic selfhood[22] while the self-imitation of incurious Altgier forgoes that chance in favour of a shallow pretence to hypothetical roots.

References

Bosworth, David (1997): ‘Echo and Narcissus: The Fearful Logic of Postmodern Thought’, in:Georgia Review, Vol.51, No.3, pp.409-37.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1996): The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Cambridge: Polity.

Dux, Gunter (2011): Historico-Genetic Theory of Culture: On the Processual Logic of Cultural Change, Bielefeld: transcript.

Gehlen, Arnold (1986): Urmensch und Spätkultur, Wiesbaden: Aula Verlag

Gronow, Jukka (1993): ‘Taste and Fashion: The Social Function of Fashion and Style’ in:Acta Sociologica, Vol.36, pp.89-100.(1)

Habermas, Jürgen (1989): ‘The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective’, in:Critical Inquiry, Vol.15, No.2, pp.431-56

Heidegger, Martin (1963) [1934]: ‘Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?’, in: Martin Heidegger: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976, pp.9-13

Heidegger, Martin (1963) [1927]: Sein und Zeit, Tübingen : Niemeyer

Heidegger, Martin (1962): Being and Time, (transl. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson) New York: Harper Perennial

Miller, Daniel (2010): Stuff, Cambridge: Polity Press

Plato (1977): Timaeus and Critias, Harmondsworth: Penguin

Plessner, Helmuth (1976): Die Frage nach der Conditio humana, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Popper, Karl R. (1958): ‘Back to the Pre-Socratics: The Presidential Address’, in:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol.59, pp.1-24

Simmel, Georg (1957): ‘Fashion’, in: American Journal of Sociology, Vol.62, No.6, pp.541-58.

Simmel, Georg (1910): ‘How is Society Possible?’ , in: American Journal of Sociology, Vol.16, No.3, pp.372-391

Spyri, Johanna (1998): Heidi , Project Gutenberg e-text #1448http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1448/pg1448.html

Woodward, Sophie (2006): ‘Looking Good: Feeling Right – Aesthetics of the Self’, in: Susanne Küchler/Daniel Miller (eds.): Clothing as Material Culture, Oxford: Berg

Footnotes


[1] ‘Neulich bekam ich den zweiten Ruf and die Universität Berlin. Bein einer solchen Gelegenheit ziehe ich mich aus der Stadt auf die Hütte zurück. Ich höre, was die Berge und die Wälder und die Bauernhöfe sagen. Ich komme dabei zu meinem alten Freund, einem 75-jährigen Bauern. Er hat von dem Berliner Ruf in der Zeitung gelesen. Was wird er sagen? Er schiebt langsam den sicheren Blick seiner klaren Augen in den meinen, hält den Mund straff geschlossen, legt mir seine treu-bedächtige Hand auf die Schulter und –schütteltkaum merklich den Kopf. Das will sagen: unerbittlich Nein!‘ Heidegger, Martin (1963): ‘Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?’, in: Martin Heidegger: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976, pp.9-13 Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 12f.  ‘Recently I got a second invitation to teach at the University of Berlin. On that occasion I left Freiburg and withdrew to the cabin. I listened to what the mountains and the forest and the farmland were saying, and I went to see an old friend of mine, a 75-year old farmer. He had read about the call to Berlin in the newspapers. What would he say? Slowly he fixed the sure gaze of his clear eyes on mine, and keeping his mouth tightly shut, he thoughtfully put his faithful hand on my shoulder. Ever so slightly he shook his head. That meant: absolutely no!’  Heidegger Martin (1981): ‘Why Do I Stay in The Provinces? (1934)’, in: Thomas Sheehan (ed/transl): Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, Chicago: Precedent, pp.27-9

[2] “Be silent!” thundered the Uncle, and his eyes flashed with anger. “Go and be done with you! and never let me see you again with your hat and feather, and such words on your tongue as you come with today!” And with that he strode out of the hut. “You have made grandfather angry,” said Heidi, and her dark eyes had anything but a friendly expression in them as she looked at Dete. “He will soon be all right again; come now,” said Dete hurriedly, “and show me where your clothes are.” “I am not coming,” said Heidi.’http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext98/heidi11.txt

[3] NB the anti-cosmopolitan reference to Bodenständigkeit, whose reference to the rurality is lost in translation ‘Das Gesagtsein, das Diktum, der Ausspruch stehen jetzt ein für die Echtheit und Sachgemäßheit der Rede und ihres Verständnisses. Und weil das Reden den primären Seinsbezug zum beredten Seienden verloren, bzw. nie gewonnen hat, teilt es sich nicht mit in der Weise der ursprünglichen Zueignung dieses Seienden, sondern auf dem Wege des Weiter- und Nachredens. Dase Geredete als solches zieht weitere Kreise und übernimmt autoritativen Charakter. Die Sache ist so, weil man es sagt. In solchem Nach- und Weiterreden, dadurch sich das schon anfängliche Fehlen der Bodenständigkeit zur völligen Bodenlosigkeit steigert, konstituiert sich das Gerede.‘ (Heidegger 1963: 168) ‘The Being-said, the dictum, the pronouncement [Ausspruch] – all these now stand surety for the genuineness of the discourse and of the understanding which belongs to it, and for its appropriateness ot the facts. And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship of-Being towards the entitity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping  andpassing the word along. What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. Idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along – a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on[Bodenständigkeit] becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness [Bodenlosigkeit].’ (Heidegger 1962: 212)

[4] ‘Die freigewordene Neugier besorgt aber, um zu sehen, nicht um das Gesehene zu verstehen, das heißt in ein Sein zu ihm zu kommen, sonder nur um zu sehen. Sie sucht das Neue nur, um von ihm erneut zu Neuem abzuspringen. Nicht um zu erfassen und um wissend in der Wahrheit zu sein, geht es der Sorge dieses Sehens, sondern um die Möglichkeit des Sichüberlassens an die Welt. Daher ist die Neugier durch ein spezifischesUnverweilen beim Nächsten charakterisiert. Sie sucht daher auch nicht die Muße des betrachtenden Verweilens, sondern Unruhe und Aufregung durch das immer Neue und den Wechsel des Begegnenden. In ihrem Unverweilen besorgt die Neugier die ständige Möglichkeit der Zerstreuung.‘ (Heidegger 1963: 172)  ‘When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterized by a specific way of not tarrying alongside what is closest. Consequently it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction.’ (Heidegger 1962: 216)

‚Die beiden für die Neugier konstitutiven Momente des Unverweilens in der besorgten Umwelt und der Zerstreuung in neue Möglichkeiten fundieren den dritten Wesenscharakter dieses Phänomens, den wir die Aufenthaltslosigkeit nennen. Die Neugier ist überall und nirgends. Dieser Modus des In-der-Welt-seins enthüllt eine neue Seinsart des alltäglichen Daseins, in der es sich ständig entwurzelt.‘ (Heidegger 1963: 172f.) ‘Both this not tarryingin the environment with which one concerns oneself, and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon, which we call the character of “never dwelling anywhere” [Aufenthaltslosigkeit] . Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of a Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein – kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself.’ (Heidegger 1962: 217)

The affinity to antisemitic prejudice is palpable here – the stereotype of the “wandering Jew” is there in all but name whenever Heidegger touches on the metropolitan and cosmopolitan life he so detested.

[5] ‘The nature of the Living Being was eternal, and it was not possible to bestow this attribute fully on the created universe; but he determined to make a moving image of eternity, and so when he ordered the heavens he made in that which we call time an eternal moving image of the eternity which remains forever at one.’ (Plato 1977: 51)

[6] ‘For all change is the change of something: change presupposes something that changes.  And it presupposes that, while changing, this something must remain the same.  We may say that a green leaf changes when it turns brown; but we do not say that the green leaf changes when we substitute for it a brown leaf. It is essential to the idea of change that the thing that changes retains its identity while changing.  And yet, it must become something else:  it was green, and it becomes brown; it was moist, and it becomes dry; it was hot, and it becomes cold. Thus every change is, in a way, the transition of a thing into something with opposite qualities (as Anaximander and Anaximenes had seen).  And yet, the changing thing must remain identical during change. This is the problem of change.  It led Heraclitus to a theory which (partly anticipating Parmenides) distinguishes between reality and appearance, (Popper 1958: 12)

[7] ‘Anyone who conceives of an action, conceives of it in such a way that he mentally allows the action  to run its course to its goal, in order to then put the plan into action, or not. Planned actions are, as Alfred Schütz puts it, conceived in modo futuri exacti. In Chinese Sophism, it was held to be one of those irritatingly, overly subtle statements of argumentation to say: “Today I will set out for the South and I am already long there.” Not all action is action conceived in modo futuri exacti. A large part of everyday action takes place in a much less dramatic fashion. But even routinized actions have a precursive character. And anyone, who in the midst of an action, gives it a specific turn, by doing so objectifies himself in what he does. The reflexiveness of action is a reflexiveness that objectifies the subject in action, controllable through the reflexive form of self-perception. As such it is the basic form of daily practices.’ (Dux 2011: 78f.)

[8] A notable exception is Gronow 1993

[9] ‘Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation; it leads the individual upon the road which all travel, it furnishes a general condition, which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time it satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast, on the one hand by a constant change of contents, which gives to the fashion of today an individual stamp as opposed to that of yesterday and of to-morrow, on the other hand because fashions differ for different classes – the fashions of the upper stratum of society are never identical with those of  the lower; in fact, they are abandoned by the former as soon as the latter prepares to appropriate them.’ (Simmel, 1957: 543)

[10] quoted in Bosworth 1992: 411

[11] Gehlen makes a similar move as does Heidegger in that he on the one hand fully acknowledges plasticity and openness of human temporal existence, but as a consequence calls for order and structure to fend of the dangers of disorientation in mass society.

[12] In the extreme case of stylisation observed by Daniel Miller on Trinidad a complete move to the surface and disjunction from any “inner self” in the end opens a road to independent and strong selfhood: ‘In stark contrast to this depth ontology Trinidadians seem to have almost a horror of things becoming interiorized, rather than kept on the surface.’ (Miller 2010: 17) ‘There is a version of madness called tabanca. This afflicts people not because they have lost a relationship, but because they then discover that they allowed that relationship to get inside them, and when it ended they became distracted and disorientated. One of the most common expressions heard in response to any misfortune, from a passing insult to the break-up of a relationship, is doh (don’t) take it on. In other words implying don’t take it in. Most Trinidadians would certainly assert humour and wit as central to their self-definition and would see it as contributing to their sense of cool and style. A person without a sense of humour, who can’t take insults, is seen as ignorant and prone to violence, a label Trinidadians use of their Caribbean rivals, the Jamaicans. This keeping things on the surface also means the freedom to construct oneself and not be categorized by circumstance.’ (Miller 2010: 17)

[13] ‘… peculiar attraction of limitation, the attraction of a simultaneous beginning and end, the charm of novelty coupled to that of transitoriness. The attractions of both poles of the phenomena meet in fashion, and show also here that they belong together unconditionally, although, or rather because, they are contradictory in their very nature. Fashion always occupies the dividing-line between the past and the future, and consequently conveys a stronger feeling of the present, at least while it is at its height, than most other phenomena. What we call the present is usually nothing more than a combination of a fragment of the past with a fragment of the future.’ (Simmel 1957: 547)

[14] ‘The fact that change itself does not change, in this instance endows each of the objects which it affects with a psychological appearance of duration.’ (Simmel 1957: 557)

[15] ‘Fashion insists, to be sure, on treating all individualities alike, yet it is always done in such a way that one’s whole nature is never affected. Fashion always continues to be regarded as something external, even in spheres outside of mere styles of apparel, for the form of mutability in which it is presented to the individual is under all circumstances a contrast to the stability of the ego-feeling. Indeed, the latter, through this contrast, must become conscious of its relative duration. The changeableness of those contents can express itself as mutability and develop its attraction only through this enduring element. But for this very reason fashion always stands, as I have pointed out, at the periphery of personality, which regards itself as a pièce de résistance for fashion, or at least can do so when called upon.

It is this phase of fashion that is received by sensitive and peculiar persons as a sort of mask. They consider blind obedience to the standards of the general public in all externals as the conscious and desired means of reserving their personal feeling and their taste, which they are eager to reserve for themselves alone, in such a way that they do not care to enter in an appearance that is visible to all. It is therefore a feeling of modesty and reserve which causes many a delicate nature to seek refuge in the leveling cloak of fashion.’ (Simmel 1957: 552)

[17] ‘Weil das Man jedoch alles Urteilen und Entscheiden vorgibt, nimmt es dem jeweiligen Dasein die Verantwortlichkeit ab. Das Man kann es sich gleichsam leisten, daß „man“ sich ständig auf es beruft. Es kann am leichtesten alles verantworten, weil keiner es ist, der für etwas einzustehen braucht. Das Man „war“ es immer und doch kann gesagt werden, „keiner“ ist es gewesen.‘ (Heidegger 1963: 127)

‘Yet because the “they” presents every judgment and decision as its own, it depreives the particular Dasein of its answerability. The “they” can, as it were, manage to have “them” constantly invoking it. It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It ‘was’ always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been “no one”.’ (Heidegger 1962: 165)

[18] ‘And he gave each divine being two motions, one uniform in the same place, as each always thinks the same thoughts about the same things, the other forward, as each is subject to the movement of the Same and uniform; but he kept them unaffected by the other five kinds of motion, that each might be as perfect as possible. this is the origin of the fixed stars, which are living beings divine and eternal and remain always rotating in the same place  and the same sense; the origin of the planets and their variations, of course we have already described.’ (Plato 1977: 55)

[19] As Bourdieu emphasises – and in general: ‘Historians of philosophy too often forget that the great philosophical options which mark out the space of philosophical possibilities, such as neo-Kantianism, neo-Thomism, and phenomenology, are embodied in the palpable forms of people, who are themselves perceived in terms of their life-style, behaviour, and speech, their white hair and heir Olympian looks, and that these philosophical options are associated with moral tendencies and political choices, which give them a concrete physiognomy.’ (Bourdieu 1996: 51f.)

[20] ‘The charm of imitation in the first place is to be found in the fact that it makes possible an expedient test of power [zweckmäßiges und sinnvolles Tun – “expedient and meaningful action”], which, however, requires no great personal and creative application, but is displayed easily and smoothly, because its content is a given quantity. We might define it is as the child of thought and thoughtlessness. It affords the pregnant [??] possibility of continually extending the greatest creations of the human spirit, without the aid of the forces which were originally the very condition of their birth. Imitation, furthermore, gives to the individual the satisfaction of not standing alone in his actions. Whenever we imitate, we transfer not only the demand for creative activity, but also the responsibility for the action from ourselves to another.’ (Simmel, 1957: 542f.)

[21] ‘He is absolved from all personal responsibility, because error itself objectively befalls him. A mistake could be ascribed only to an intellectual, an unessential thinker. in the “case of the rectorate [in] 1933/34,” which “in itself” was “unimportant,” Heidegger sees, even after the war, only “a sign of the metaphysical state of the essence of science”. For him, “it is as unimportant as teh barren rooting in past attempts and measures taken, which in the context of the entire movement of the planetary will to power are so insignificant that they may not even be called tiny”’ (Habermas 1989: 450)

[22] This is what Simmel must have had in mind when saying: ‘‘We know ourselves on the one side as products of society. The physiological series of progenitors, their adaptations and fixations, the traditions of their labor, their knowledge and belief, of the whole spirit of the past crystallized in objective forms – all these determine the equipment and the contents of our life, so that the question might arise whether the individual is anything more than a receptacle in which previously existing elements mix in changing proportions; for although the elements were also in the last analysis produced by individuals, yet the contribution of each is a disappearing  quantity, and only through their generic and societary merging were the factors produced in the synthesis of which in turn the ostensible individuality may consist. On the other hand we know ourselves as a member of society, woven with our life-process and its meaning and purpose quite as interdependently into its coexistence (Nebeneinander) as in the other view into its succession (Nacheinander). Little as we in our character as natural objects have a self-sufficiency, because the intersection of the natural elements proceeds through us as through completely selfless structures, and the equality, before the laws of nature resolves our existence without re|mainder into a mere example of their necessity – quite as little do we live as societary beings around an autonomous center; but we are from moment to moment composed out of reciprocal relationships to others, and we are thus comparable with the corporeal  substance which for us exists only as the sum of many impressions of the senses, but not as a self-sufficient entity. Now, however, we feel that this social diffusion does not completely dissolve our personality. This is not because of the reservations previously mentioned, or of particular contents whose meaning and development rest from the outset only in the individual soul, and finds no   position at large in the social correlation. It is not only because of the molding of the social contents, whose unity as individual soul is not itself again of social nature, any more than the artistic form, in which the spots of color merge upon the canvas, can be derived from the chemical nature of the colors themselves. It is rather chiefly because the total life-content, however completely it may be applicable from the social antecedents and reciprocities, is yet at the same time capable of consideration under the category of the singular life, as experience of the individual and completely oriented with reference to this experience.’  (Simmel 1910: 385f.)